'In every crisis there’s an invisible adhesive that holds Europe together'

Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU has had to take harsh criticism. Some say the confederation of states lacks solidarity. Philosopher and historian Luuk van Middelaar of the Netherlands comes to different conclusions in a conversation with Daniel Steinvorth.
 

By Daniel Steinvorth

Mr van Middelaar, after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 migration crisis, the coronavirus crisis is the third and perhaps most difficult test in the history of the EU. Might it tear the international community apart?

I think it’s too early at this stage to speak of an existential crisis for the EU. First of all, we’re dealing with a public health crisis that is being experienced very much as a national crisis in all European countries. Presidents, heads of government and kings address their citizens as companions navigating a national fate. It’s the national governments that are at the forefront of the fight against the virus because they’re ultimately responsible for health policy. For me, that’s the big difference between this and the financial crisis. The euro was one of the most important achievements of European integration. Back then, the common currency neared collapse three times. It would have truly been a shock to the EU.

You don’t think that the unresolved conflicts of the past are catching up with the EU in the present crisis?

Of course the economic consequences of the coronavirus shutdown will be disastrous. There’s a new crisis on the way. Fortunately, though, the EU states have already taken some efforts to cushion the worst effects. It’s true that the conflicts of the past decade have caught up with us when it comes to pent-up frustration and unhealed wounds. This is particularly striking in the present debate about financial solidarity: In the past, Italy already felt abandoned by its EU partners, for example when it came to migration policy. That’s why some now argue that Eurobonds are the order of the day to prevent Matteo Salvini from winning the next elections.

Do you think that argument holds water?

We also need to keep an eye on the North’s side of the equation. And primarily the euro sceptics in Germany and the Netherlands are just waiting to take advantage of every step their governments take towards the permanent communitisation of debt. The debate over corona bonds is a political minefield everywhere.

When the Italians speak of solidarity, they don’t just mean corona bonds.

Italy was undoubtedly abandoned in the early stages of the crisis. It didn’t get the help it needed. Instead, Germany and France restricted exports of medical protective wear, which was unjustifiable. Tragically, the virus first had to cross the Alps to convince other Europeans that it was dangerous.

The question is how much selfishness and dissent can the EU tolerate? Your compatriot, Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans, warned a few days ago that the European Union as we know it cannot survive this crisis.

I prefer to respond to that from a historical perspective. How often in recent decades has the end of the Union, the end of the Schengen area, or the end of the common market been predicted? Ten years ago, some Anglo-Saxon economists even determined almost the exact day that the euro would cease to exist. But it’s still here. I think the EU is much more resilient than many think. When unity is really at stake, there’s a kind of invisible adhesive that holds it together. By that I don’t only mean the pursuit of economic interests, but the deeper cultural and historical awareness of being part of Europe.

Are crises simply part of the EU?

Yes. Occasionally, the heads of state and government even have to invoke a crisis to make quick decisions possible. You could also say that panic is part of the EU’s crisis management. The system needs a sense of survival to become active. I think that was also the reason why Frans Timmermans sent out such a dramatic message.

Referring to the power of the bureaucrats and the political disenfranchisement of the citizens, the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger described the EU as “Brussels, the gentle monster.” How much of this monster is still in Brussels’ institutions today?

Actually, the events of the past ten years have overtaken Enzensberger’s narrative. Of course the common market is still a central part of the EU. But the public debates today are no longer about the curvature of cucumbers or other bureaucratic clichés, but about things that affect people directly: events at the borders, the currency, our relations with Russia, with China, with the USA. Today, the EU is less concerned with technocratic details than with unforeseen events. I call this event policy, which has replaced regulatory policy. As a rule-based system that was not equipped to deal with shocks and crises, the EU had to reinvent itself in some areas.

How does this event policy manifest itself in the coronavirus crisis?

The coronavirus crisis exemplifies how politicians have to accept living with uncertainty. German Chancellor Merkel understood this when she described the crisis as “serious and open-ended.” In his most recent speech to the French people, President Macron, who in normal times never admits to not knowing something, said that he wanted to share with them “ce que nous savons et ce que nous ne savons pas.” The uncertainty about what the virus is doing to our societies makes any bureaucratic approach difficult – and in a much more fundamental way than in previous crises.

And how do you think the Commission, the heart of the Brussels bureaucracy, has performed in this crisis so far?

The Commission eased the EU budget and state aid rules at a very early stage. This gave the governments scope for action, for example to save companies from bankruptcy. It understood that the Member States are on the front lines fighting for human lives and jobs. I was disappointed, however, when it came to organising a medical equipment procurement programme. The public tenders referred to months but Italy needed the aid within 24 hours. In that case, the Commission didn’t grasp that we’re no longer living in normal economic times. It should have, at least as far as the medical goods market is concerned, triggered a wartime economy as the American president did.

Does it have that ability at all?

Yes, it’s even in its DNA. Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the Commission, was a man who organised the demand for goods and their logistics for the Allies in two world wars. Of course, there are always good arguments for bureaucratic procedures: They ensure fairness and predictability, theoretically everyone is treated equally, they prevent corruption, etc. But in unprecedented times, flexible decisions have to be made, so quick judgment and leadership are required.

To come back to the “invisible adhesive” that, in your opinion, glues the alliance of Europeans together: According to surveys, only a minority of citizens in Italy are now committed to the EU. Doesn’t that worry you?

It does. And in the case of Brexit, we’ve seen that insufficient support can lead to membership termination. Yet the British were never wholehearted members; they never had a real sense of European identity as the Italians do. The Italians’ disappointment is very real, at the moment some are even more inclined towards the Russians and Chinese than the Germans and French. But I think there is still a broad awareness that the benefits outweigh all that; that it’s better to sit inside than outside the clubhouse. And I cannot imagine that their sympathies towards Russia and China will be long lasting politically.

What’s it like in your country? How great is approval for the European project in the Netherlands?

According to surveys, a large majority of the Dutch would vote to stay in the EU, so a “Nexit” wouldn’t have a chance right now. There are plenty of points of friction with Brussels, which also give the EU sceptics a tailwind. But the Dutch are pragmatic. They know what advantages the common market offers them.

The Netherlands recently made itself very unpopular in the dispute over coronavirus aid. Finance minister Wobke Hoekstra wanted to know why some countries don’t have sufficient financial capacity to deal with the effects of the pandemic.

It was pretty foolish and not a shining diplomatic moment. The Dutch position is quite comparable to the position in Germany, where the same reservations about euro bonds are shared. The problem is that both countries are presently under considerable moral pressure. In times when life and death are at stake, the argument to act in solidarity is simply much more important than in times when one can accuse a country of simply doing poorly economically.

Where do you see Switzerland in this crisis? There’s traditionally a high level of EU scepticism here, and many may feel their scepticism is confirmed when they look at the current clashes. At the same time, everyone feels like we’re in the same boat and cooperation is essential.

It is significant that Switzerland, as a non-EU country, is no less exposed to the public health crisis and the coming economic crisis than its neighbours. In this situation there are, as in all European countries, two predominant narratives in the public discourse: one that emphasises what we have in common, and one that emphasises the divides in Europe. This should also remind us that no country can be seen as a homogeneous block and that there are different perspectives and conflicts not only between, but also within the states.

Commentator and speechwriter

Luuk van Middelaar, born in 1973, is a professor of EU law and European studies at the University of Leiden and a political commentator for the NRC Handelsblad and De Standaard. From 2010 to 2014, the historian and political philosopher worked as a speechwriter and close advisor to the EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy. Van Middelaar is best known for his 2009 book The Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union (Yale University Press, 2013).