The Tragedy of the Commons   Self-governance as a way out of the dilemma

How can societies escape the seemingly inescapable dilemma of overexploiting natural resources? In her studies, Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom shows that this can indeed be achieved - without central government regulation or privatization, but purely through the self-administration of local groups.

The debate about the “tragedy of the commons” has accompanied the social sciences for decades.Originally formulated by Garret Hardin, this concept describes the phenomenon that freely accessible, communally used resources - whether grazing land or fishing grounds - often end up in a race towards overexploitation. The individual actor has the incentive to use the natural resource as intensively as possible, because if he does not do so, the others will reap the potential benefits. The consequence of this logic is its inevitable overexploitation. In order to limit use, Hardin proposed the granting of private usage rights or the nationalization of the resource.

Local self-government - the power of the small community

However, Ostrom's work shows a third way out of the supposed dilemma. In her magnum opus Governing the Commons, she used numerous examples to demonstrate that communities can manage their resources sustainably through cooperative self-governance.

A successful example of water use is the irrigation system in Huerta, Spain. The Tribunal de las Aguas, a water court formed by local farmers, has existed here for centuries and decides independently on the use and distribution of water. The system works on the basis of community rules and transparency: conflicts over water rights are resolved publicly and efficiently, without state bureaucracy. The communal nature of this institution has made it possible to develop sustainable usage practices that prevent overuse and secure the water supply for all. The example from Spain already points to key factors for successful self-administration: a clearly definable commons is managed sustainably within a small community by means of a historically evolved system of norms for usage rights. Ostrom has shown that these small communities have an important characteristic: “trustworthiness” - mutual trust is much easier to build in small communities than in larger communities. The possibility of direct communication in particular is invaluable for this. Reciprocal behavior becomes likely because everyone can rely on the fact that everyone is playing by the rules and no one is enriching themselves at the expense of others.

The limits of Ostrom's theory - economic interests vs. the common good

While Ostrom's theory can explain public welfare-oriented action in small groups, the theory reaches its limits when short-term interests come into play. Farmers in Spain also adhere to the rules on water abstraction because they have a long-term interest in managing their plantations. However, when usage rights are sold to corporations or come under the influence of speculative markets, the focus is on short-term profit. These actors also operate outside the local communities and thus escape the social mechanisms of control and reciprocity.

The privatization of water resources in Chile is an example of the allocation of water rights that has undermined local self-government. Since the 1980s, water rights have been introduced there as tradable goods, often awarded to large agricultural and mining companies. The case of the Petorca region in central Chile is particularly prominent: while avocado plantations export internationally and consume enormous quantities of water in the process, local communities suffer from water shortages and have to resort to tanker supplies. Ostrom's theory also makes it easy to understand why global commons problems, such as the climate crisis, are so difficult to solve. In these cases, there are simply none of the success factors for common good-oriented behavior. The number of people affected is enormous, as is the diversity of their norms and values. Direct communication and building trusting relationships are just as difficult as effectively punishing nations that do not adhere to climate targets.

Self-governance as part of the solution

The examples mentioned show that in many cases the solution cannot lie in local self-government alone, especially in the case of global commons problems. The challenge is therefore rather to integrate the power of regional self-governance into larger political and economic structures, such as international climate agreements.

State actors in particular are called upon to create a legal framework to enable the success of local self-administration - be it through the (re)granting of usage rights or targeted measures to build such communities. However, this presupposes one thing: an understanding on the part of political actors that the common good must not be sacrificed in the pursuit of short-term profit.